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CROSSING THE S1YX 
ABSTRACT 
The Court of Appeal decision in Vector v Transpower effectively 
eliminates the doctrine of Prime Necessity in New Zealand. The 
decision depletes the range of mechanisms, through which 
monopoly-operated public utilities can be controlled. The prime 
necessities doctrine should be seen to have a role to play in the 
New Zealand framework. This paper concludes that the role of 
the doctrine is reconcilable with light-handed regulation. 
Furthermore, without the doctrine, the remaining safeguards in 
the Commerce Act 1986, and where relevant, the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, are ineffective to guard against abuses of 
monopoly power. The significance of utilities of prime necessity 
necessitates some control on monopoly power. In short this 
paper argues that the doctrine itself, is of prime necessity to the 
New Zealand context. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 13,966 
words. 
4 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Greek mythology, the subterranean river, Styx, surrounded the 
Underworld. Charon, the official ferryman of the Underworld, was 
known to be difficult to deal with. The fare he charged to those who 
had died and wished to cross the Styx and enter the underworld was 
no more and no less than a gold sovereign. Unless the deceased 
presented this fare to Charon he would mercilessly leave them on the 
banks of the river, without refuge forever. The Greeks therefore always 
placed a sovereign in the mouths of their dead.1 
Charon was in a position of great power. Had he wanted to abuse this 
position he could have charged arbitrary and excessive fares. His 
passengers would have had no alternative but to submit. Such 
behaviour is arguably unfair and unreasonable, yet in the absence of 
any control Charon was in a position to do just this. 
This myth illustrates the position which arises today where services or 
utilities which are essential in nature are operated by a monopoly. 
Whereas there was nothing prohibiting Charon from exerting his 
power, today the doctrine of Prime Necessity may provide some relief 
from this situation. 
The doctrine of prime necessity ensures supply of and access to utilities 
that are deemed to be fundamentally important. This is achieved by 
obliging a monopolist owner of a public facility to only charge fair and 
reasonable prices to users. In a recent decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Vector Limited v Transpower New Zealand Limited} it was held that 
there is no room for the operation of the doctrine in New Zealand's 
current regime. The primary reason behind the decision was the 
inconsistency of the doctrine with the Commerce Act and to some 
1 Felix Guirand New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology: Introduction by Robert Graves 
(Hamlyn Publishing, Middlesex, 1959) 165. 
2 (31 August 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 32/ 99 [Vector v Transpower]. 
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extent the State-Owned Enterprise. The ruling signals the demise of a 
common law doctrine that has enjoyed a rich history in New Zealand 
and overseas. 
In light of the decision in Vector v Transpower, this paper examines 
whether the doctrine ought to exist in New Zealand. Two aspects must 
be addressed. 
First, the Court's determination that the doctrine is inconsistent with 
the current regime is questioned. This paper submits that the doctrine 
has a vital role to play in New Zealand's Light-Handed framework. 
Light-handed regulation is intended to avoid regulators, regulatory 
commissions and price control. Recourse in the courts however, is part 
of light-handed regulation. In the absence of any express or implied 
repeal the doctrine is consistent with New Zealand's competition law 
framework. 
Secondly, the necessity of the doctrine in New Zealand's regulatory 
context must be emphasised. In New Zealand's regulatory context 
there is a serious gap, or as some call it, "a legal vacuum"3 in the 
regulation of public utilities in New Zealand. The competition law 
framework in New Zealand provides no adequate guarantee of access 
to utilities of public importance. Such utilities are fundamental and 
warrant such a guarantee by the law. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that in the absence of regulation of 
public utilities the doctrine provides some relief from what would 
otherwise be a legal void. 
In view of this purpose the paper is presented as follows. Broadly the 
paper can be broken into four main sections. The first section 
establishes the doctrine. It looks at the origins, the steps taken towards 
3 A R Galbraith "Deregulation, Privatisation and Corporatisation of Crown Activity: 
How will the law respond?" in Conference Papers: The 1993 New Zealand Law Conference 
(1993) vol 1, 236. 
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developing the doctrine of prime necessity, and the elements. 
Following this section, the decision of Vector v Transpower is discussed. 
The third section contemplates the consistency of the doctrine in New 
Zealand's statutory and policy framework. The final section looks at 
the regulation of public utilities in overseas jurisdictions. Both judicial 
and legislative techniques are examined to establish the need for the 
doctrine in New Zealand. 
II. THE POTENTIAL HAZARD 
The doctrine applies to suppliers of public utilities with monopoly-like 
characteristics. Monopoly suppliers of utilities which are considered 
essential services find themselves in a position of special advantage. 
This position creates a potential for abuse because of the fact that they 
are a monopoly supplier and that the resource in question is so 
essential. The supplier has the capacity to charge more than in a 
competitive market. In the types of utilities covered by the doctrine, 
barriers to entry are likely to be high, so that a firm's capacity to abuse 
a monopoly position is greater.4 
The New Zealand environment is of particular concern. Many public 
utilities were previously owned by the state and then corporatised or 
privatised in the state reforms of the 1980's. 
Consequently, many public utilities today lie in the hands of private 
companies. In addition, in comparison with other countries, New 
Zealand has a highly deregulated economy. 
4 This is because facilities of prime necessity often possess natural monopoly 
characteristics. For example, the National Grid or the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN). 
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III. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. Lord Hale's Treatise 
In approximately 1670, Sir Mathew Hale, (then Chief Justice of the 
King's Bench of England), produced a manuscript. The manuscript was 
put away among his private papers. It was not until a century later, 
when the manuscript was presented to Francis Hargrave, that the essay 
resurfaced and was published by Hargrave in a collection of 
manuscripts.5 
The essay consisted of a treatise divided into three parts. "De Jure 
Maris", "De Portibus Maris" and "Concerning the customs of goods 
imported and exported". De Portibus Maris is of special significance to the 
Prime Necessity doctrine, because the ideas and principles in the essay 
are found in the doctrine. 
B. De Portibus Maris 
De Portibus Maris is concerned with the regulation of ports. Lord Hale 
considered that there were three categories of rights: the rights and 
powers of the King, the rights of the person and the rights of things. 
Lord Hale distinguishes between rights of things that are juris publici, 
and juris privati. Juris publici related to things that are common to all 
the king's subjects. Examples, include common highways, bridges, 
rivers and ports. Juris privati, relates to things that are personal and 
real. Lord Hale did not determine all rivers and ports to be juris publici. 
5 The essay has been published on several occasions. The first such occasion is 
Francis Hargrave "A Collection of Tracts relative to the Law of England from 
Manuscripts" Hargrave's Law Tracts (Dublin, 1787). See also BP McAllister "Lord 
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Small creeks that were not common passage for the king's subjects 
were private. In an often repeated passage Lord Hale enunciated the 
principle flowing from juris publici:6 
a man may for his own private advantage ... set up a wharf or 
crane, and may take what rate he and his customers can 
agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth 
no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz. makes the 
most of his own. 
If the king or subject have a publick wharf, unto which all 
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade 
their goods as for the purpose, because they are wharfs only 
licensed by the queen ... or because there is no other wharf in 
that port, ... there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive 
duties ... but the duties must be reasonable and moderate ... 
For now the wharf and crane ... are affected with a publick 
interest, and they cease to be juris privati only. 
Lord Hale propounds therefore, that in the case of things juris publici 
tolls may not be excessive. The duty does not extend to services which 
are ordinarily juris privati. It is only where that wharf (or other service) 
is a "publick" wharf "unto which all persons that come to that port 
must come"7 that it becomes juris publici and obligations follow. 
Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest" 43 Harv L Rev 759, which 
analyses Lord Hale's work. 
6 Hargrave, above n 5, 77-78. 
7 Hargrave, above n 5, 77. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT AS A COMMON LAW DOCTRINE 
A. A Creature of the Common Law 
The first case to apply Lord Bale's principle was the English case of 
Bolt v Stennett. 8 The case involved an action in trespass to the plaintiff's 
crane on a public, open quay within the port of London. The 
defendant, Stennett claimed that the crane was essential to enable them 
to carry out their duty as the loader and unloader of goods in the Port, 
appointed by the City of London. Bolt responded by arguing that the 
public had no right to enter on all the quays in the port of London, nor 
to use the cranes situated there. 
Referring to Lord Bale's passage above, the Court found a likeness 
between a public quay and Lord Bale's 'public street' and held that the 
defendants could claim a right to the use of the crane upon reasonable 
terms. On this basis, the court held that Bolt's crane although privately 
owned, was nonetheless affected with a public interest. 
Soon after Bolt v Stennett the English Court applied the doctrine in the 
case of Allnut v Inglis. 9 The case involved the question of whether the 
London Dock Company, which enjoyed a statutory monopoly license 
to receive certain wines, could charge at their pleasure. Lord 
Ellenborough recognised the general principle that "every man may fix 
what prices he pleases", but held that this was not so where the public 
had a "right to resort to his premises ... and he have a monopoly in 
them". For if "he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must as an 
equivalent [to that benefit] perform the duty attached to it on 
reasonable terms". 10 Lord Ellenborough added that if the monopoly 
8 (1800) 8 TR 606; 101 ER 1572 [Bolt]. 
9 (1810) 12 East 527; 104 ER 206 [Allnutt]. 
10 Allnutt, above n 9,538. 
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position of the dock company ceased to exist (by the crown extending 
the license to other places) the obligation may not apply. 
These two cases incorporate Lord Bale's principle into English case 
law. They show the extension of the principle to services beyond a 
public wharf. The cases illustrate the relationship between the public's 
right to have access to the crane or dock arising out of the monopoly 
position of the owner and the nature of the utility. The combination of 
the two results in a duty to provide reasonable access. 
B. A Development of Common Callings 
There are similarities between the Lord Bale's principle and the law of 
common callings. Under the law of common callings the courts 
imposed an obligation to charge only a reasonable price on those who 
exercised a common calling. Common callings encompassed those 
who held out their services to the public generally such as common 
carriers, innkeepers and millers.11 The law originated well before Lord 
Bale's treatise during times of economic and social difficulty, such as 
the Black Death of 1348. The obligation was a means to counter the 
market power possessed by tradesmen who could otherwise charge 
any price they pleased. Craig links this body of law to the earlier cases 
of Bolt and Allnutt noting that the development of this body of law 
leaned towards monopolies such as railways and public utilities.
12 
11 P.P Craig Administrative Law (3ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1994) 224 
[Administrative Law] . 
12 Administrative Law, above nll, 224. The Court of Appeal in Vector v Transpower also 
noted the link: Vector v Transpower above n 2, 19. 
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C. Munn v Illinois: The American Public Utility doctrine 
The principle lay unused in the English courts for some time. 
However, in the United States of America, the doctrine was seized by 
the Illinois Supreme Court, in the late nineteenth century. Munn v 
Illinois13 marked the beginning of the corresponding American doctrine 
on public utilities. The development of this body of law in the United 
States is traced back to Lord Bale's treatise through the decision of 
Munn. However, the doctrine was applied into a rather unique 
constitutional context. In the United States, Lord Bale's principle was 
used as a means of defending the imposition of legislative price 
regulation against claims of unconstitutionality. The 5th and 14th 
Amendments of the US Constitution prohibit the taking of property 
without 'due-process' of law.14 Legislative price regulation was argued 
to be taking "property" because it took away the right of citizens to use 
their property uninhibited. 
Delivering the judgment of the majority, Chief Justice Waite declined to 
find the legislation regulating public warehouses repugnant to the US 
Constitution. Waite CJ asserted that from time immemorial in 
England, and since colonisation in the United States, it has been 
customary to regulate such services as ferries, common carriers and 
wharfingers.15 Chief Justice Waite pointed to the common law as the 
source of this power to regulate prices. Re-affirming the notion that 
when private property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to be 
Juris privati only", Waite CJ described the principle as having been "an 
13 (1876) 94 US 76 [Munn]. 
14 The Fifth Amendment relates to the Federal Government and the Fourteenth to 
State Government. 
15 Munn above n 13, 125. 
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essential element in the law of property ever since".
16 Property, he 
confirmed does become: 17 
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it 
of public consequence, and affect the community at large. 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the 
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interests in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the 
public and for the common good. 
Waite CJ did not however find favour with all of the members of the 
bench. Justice Field delivered the dissenting judgment of the Court 
with Justice Strong concurring. Justice Field interpreted Lord Hale's 
principle as limited to "property dedicated by the owner to public uses, 
or to property the use of which was granted by the government, or in 
connection with which special privileges were conferred".
18 
The minority judgment takes a very narrow interpretation of Lord 
Hale's principle. Although the London Dock Company had a statutory 
monopoly, Hale's principle extends to things which are Juris privati 
where they take on a public interest. This public interest is derived 
inherently from the type of service being offered, and the surrounding 
circumstances which make that service essential because that service is 
one "unto which all persons" must come.
19 A narrow interpretation of 
Hale's principle blurs the distinction between Juris privati and Juris 
publici. It makes redundant Lord Hale's references to wharves which 
cease to be Juris privati because there is no other wharf. 
16 Munn, above n 13, 126. 
17 Munn, above n 13, 126. 
18 Munn, above, n 13, 139. Justice Field has been joined in his opinion by other 
prominent jurists including Justice Thomas Cooley. See Professor Michael Taggart 
"Public Utilities and Public Law" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 214, 223 ["Public Utilities and Public Law"]. 
19 Hargrave, above n 5, 77. 
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D. City of Levis - a Doctrine of Prime Necessity 
In Minister of Justice for the Dominion of Canada v City of Levis2° the Privy 
Council considered the obligation on the part of a municipal 
corporation, Levis Council, to supply water to buildings of the 
Dominion government. The government claimed immunity from local 
taxation, which the council accepted, but claimed reasonable 
remuneration for water supplied. Dismissing the appeal from the 
Superior Court of Quebec the Privy Council found for the Council. 
Lord Parmoor held that the Government cannot claim a supply of 
water unless it was prepared to pay a fair and reasonable price. While 
accepting that the Council did not have a monopoly, Lord Parmoor 
said:21 
It must be recognised, however, that water is a matter of prime 
necessity, and that, where waterworks have been established to 
give a supply of water within a given area for domestic and 
sanitary purposes, it would be highly inconvenient to exclude 
from the advantages of such supply Government buildings, on 
the ground that these buildings are not liable to water taxation. 
The respondents are dealers in water on whom there has been 
conferred, by statute, a position of great and special advantage, 
... Their Lordships are therefore of [the] opinion that there is an 
implied obligation on the respondents to give a water supply to 
the government building provided that, and so long as, the 
Government of Canada is willing, in consideration of such 
supply, to make a fair and reasonable payment. 
The judgment of Levis makes no reference to Lord Hale's works, nor 
the earlier cases relying on Hale. Levis has been criticised for this and 
20 [1919] AC 505 (PC) [Levis]. 
21 Levis above n 20, 513. 
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some suggest it cannot be regarded as a landmark case.22 Nevertheless 
Levis introduces the phrase "Prime necessity" to the common law. 
Subsequent cases, have cited Levis widely with approval, including the 
Court of Appeal in Vector v Transpower,23 and it can be regarded as 
responsible for the line of cases that have developed in Canada and 
New Zealand. 
V. DEVELOPMENT AS A COMMON LAW DOCTRINE IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
A. Initial Rejection 
The New Zealand courts have applied the doctrine on numerous 
occasions. However the doctrine did have a questionable introduction 
to New Zealand law. Before the Privy Council decision in Levis, the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wellington Gas Company v Patten24 
rejected the doctrine as expounded in Allnutt. Distinguishing Allnutt, 
Williams J limited Lord Hale's principle to cases where the public can 
point to some right (beyond the doctrine) to demand supply.25 The 
Wellington Gas Company Act 1870, Williams J held, negatived an 
obligation to supply. The decision has not been followed in any 
subsequent New Zealand decisions and on the basis of the direction of 
22 Even Professor Taggart notes its inherent shortcomings: "Public Utilities and Public 
Law", above n 18, 241 . 
23 Vector v Transpower above n 2, 20. 
24 [1881] NZLR 3 CA 205 [Patten]. Another decision before 1919 was the Court of 
Appeal decision in Pollock v Saunders (1897) 15 NZLR 581, in which the Court of 
Appeal cautioned against extensive use of the doctrine because of its "interference 
with and restriction of the rights of private property". 
25 Patten above n 24, 208. 
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later cases one commentator avidly suggests that it can no longer be 
considered to be good law.26 
B. Acceptance of the Doctrine 
The first New Zealand decision to follow the doctrine after Levis is the 
decision of the Mayor of Auckland v The King. 27 The case involved the 
payment of rubbish collection charges from the Post Office department. 
The Court held that rubbish collection was of prime necessity, and that 
the Crown should be liable to pay a fair and reasonable fee. Since 
Mayor of Auckland the doctrine has been accepted and applied widely. 
The Court of Appeal in State Advances Superintendent v Auckland City 
Corporation and the One Tree Hill Borough28 cited Levis as establishing a 
obligation outside the statute. The fact situation in State Advances 
involved a dispute between the City Corporation and the Borough over 
the terms of the supply of water to the Crown. Myers CJ began by 
summarising the principles established and enunciated by the 
authorities.29 The judicial authorities, he said, establish that a body 
which has a practical monopoly in respect of a service of prime 
necessity, has "an obligation (implied where not expressed) to supply 
water to all those requiring it and who are prepared to pay a fair and 
reasonable charge". 30 
26 "Public Utilities and Public Law" above n 18, 242-243. 
27 [1924] GLR 415 [Mayor of Auckland]. 
28 [1932] NZLR 1709 [State Advances]. 
29 The Chief Justice cited Levis, Sheffield Waterworks Co. v Wilkinson 4 CPD 410, and 
McLean v Municipal Council of Dubbo 10 NSWSR 911. 
30 State Advances above n 28, 1715. 
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In both Wairoa Electric Power Board v Wairoa Borough31 and South 
Taranaki Electric Power Board v Patea Borough32 contractual negotiations 
had broken down between the monopoly suppliers of electricity and 
the local borough. The court in both cases applied the doctrine to 
resolve the question of price for the continued supply of electricity. 
Nearly, four decades later, the Court of Appeal in Auckland Energy 
Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand33 referred to the 
judgment of Myers CJ in State Advances. Affirming Justice Barker's 
decision to strike out the claim on the prime necessity doctrine, the 
Court held that it was "common ground" that Electricorp as a 
monopoly supplier was obliged to supply electricity at fair and 
reasonable prices.34 The Privy Council was however more cautious. 
Having recorded a concession by ECNZ of their obligations under the 
doctrine, their Lordships refrained from accepting or rejecting the 
Court of Appeal's views on the applicability of the doctrine to a State-
owned enterprise.35 This left the applicability of the doctrine in some 
doubt. 
The doctrine has been cited, and in some instances applied, in other 
cases since 1986.36 Justice McGechan called it an "arcane" doctrine in 
New Zealand Rail Limited v Port of Marlborough.37 But in the later case of 
New Zealand Private Hospitals Association - Auckland Branch Inc v 
31 [1937] NZLR 211 [Wairoa]. 
32 [1955] NZLR 954 [South Tarawki]. 
33 [1994] 1 NZLR 551 (CA) [AEPB v ECNZ]. 
34 AEPB v ECNZ above n 33, 557. 
35 Mercun; Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 
(PC) [Mercury v ECNZ]. 
36 See also Westgate, Transport Limited v Methanex New Zealand Limited (8 June 1998) 
unreported, High Court, Auckland CP 93/98; Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
v Geyser/and Airways Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 116. 
37 (1 April 1993) unreported, High Court, Blenheim Registry, CP 8/91. 
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Northern Regional Health Authority, the doctrine was referred to as a 
"well established" principle.38 
Until Vector v Transpower the doctrine was assumed to exist in New 
Zealand. Now the position has changed drastically. Before turning to 
that decision, the elements of the doctrine need to be examined. 
VI. DEFINING OF THE DOCTRINE 
For the doctrine to be applicable several elements must be satisfied. 
The leading case of Levis articulates the doctrine as having three main 
components: a service of prime necessity, supplied by body in a 
position of special advantage, implies an obligation to supply that 
service for a fair and reasonable price.39 
A. Effect of the doctrine 
If the doctrine is applicable some courts assert that where a contract has 
been entered into, that contract will not be effective to the extent that it 
is inconsistent with the doctrine.40 This would mean that the notions of 
fairness implied by the doctrine would prevail over the common law 
freedom of contract. Prima facie this sounds undesirable. However the 
ideas behind Lord Hale' s principle and the law of common callings 
were intended to counteract the market power of tradesmen who could 
38 (7 December 1994) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 400-94 
Blanchard J. 
39 Levis, above n 20, 513. 
40 Chastain v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1972) 32 DLR (3d) 443, 458 
[Chastain]. 
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"exact any price they pleased".41 The obligation to provide service at 
reasonable rates was to address injustices whether contractual or not. 
Therefore to give the doctrine any effect it is desirable to allow it to 
prevail over contracts extracting unfair prices. 
B. Elements of the Doctrine 
1. Prime Necessity 
The notion of prime necessity has been interpreted to require such 
services that are of "fundamental importance to the public".42 The 
doctrine need not necessarily be publicly owned, it is the importance of 
the service to the public. The idea of 'prime necessity' echoes the 
sentiment of a business affected with a public interest. It is consistent 
with the principle as first postulated by Lord Hale when he spoke of a 
public wharf "unto which all persons that come to that port must 
come". It is the necessity of the service to the public that causes the 
utility to be of prime necessity. In New Zealand the services which the 
courts have considered to be of prime necessity are water,43 electricity,44 
sewerage,45 and ports.46 47 
41 Artebum "The Origin and First Test of Public Callings" 75 Univ Penn Rev (1926-27) 
411,421. 
42 Chastain, above n 40, 454. 
43 State Advances above n 28. Note the decision of Hutt Golf Course Estate v Hutt City 
Corporation [1945] NZLR 56 where the majority held the doctrine only applied to the 
supply of water and not water connection charges. 
44 Wairoa above n 31; South Taranaki above n 32. 
45 Auckland City v Auckland Metropolitan Fire Board [1967] NZLR 615. 
46 New Zealand Rail Limited v Port Marlborough [1993] 2 NZLR 641 [NZ Rail]. 
47 For a more extensive list of the different services to which the doctrine has been 
successfully and unsuccessfully argued see John Land "The Role of the Prime 
Necessities Doctrine in the control of central services" in New Zealand Institute for 
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In New Zealand the doctrine has not been extended to a wide variety 
of utilities. The Commerce Commission doubted that the doctrine 
would apply to NGC, since there were few firms for which gas was an 
essential commodity.48 The application of the doctrine to 
telecommunications is a possibility, since it is very likely that a New 
Zealand court would hold that telecommunications are today regarded 
as a prime necessity. 
The definition of a pnme necessity is not static. It will change 
depending on the social conditions.49 
2. A Position of Special Advantage 
It is no surprise that businesses that are of prime necessity tend to be 
monopolistic since this is why the supply of their service is so 
necessary. But it is not sufficient that the business supply a service of a 
prime necessity. It must also occupy a position of "special advantage", 
as the Court in Levis expressed it, or a "practical monopoly", as 
expressed in Wairoa and South Taranaki.50 In assessing whether a 
business occupies a position of special advantage the courts have 
looked at the feasibility and costs of alternative forms of supply. This 
was the case in South Taranaki, where the Supreme Court held that the 
Power Board had a practical monopoly.51 It would seem that the 
standard required to satisfy the requirement of special advantage need 
not be exceptionally high. 
International Research (ed) Clarifying latest trends & future directions in Competition Law 
and Practice: 28 & 29 August, 1995, The James Cook Centre, Wellington (New Zealand 
Institute for International Research, Wellington, 1995) 10 - 12. 
48 Re Natural Gas Corporation of New Zealand Limited and Enerco New Zealand Limited CC 
Decision No 270 (22/11/93). 
49 See also the Court of Appeals comments in Vector v Transpower above n 2, 22. 
50 Wairoa above n 31,215; South Taranaki above n 32, 961-962. 
51 South Taranaki above n 32,962. 
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The doctrine is not contingent on statutory provisions governing the 
supply of the service. McIntyre Jin Chastain made the point that the 
authorities do not proceed on the basis of a statutory obligation to 
supply. The statutes, he says are merely declaratory of the common 
law principles. This view is analogous to the approach in the United 
States, since what Munn effectively established was that the right of the 
legislature to impose price controls, derived from the common law 
principles. The legislative price restrictions, like statutes McIntyre J 
refers to are arguably equally declaratory of the common law. 
3. Application of the Doctrine to the Crown 
Intuitively, the Crown is the type of party that one would expect the 
doctrine apply to. However, there have been no cases where the 
doctrine has been applied to the Crown as a supplier. This should not 
restrict the application of the doctrine to the Crown ( or instruments of 
the Crown). Common law doctrines are equally applicable to the 
Crown.52 In the common law doctrine of prime necessity, the doctrine 
should be applied in the same way as any other supplier of that utility. 
The Crown is often in the position of monopoly supplier and it is 
expected that they would supply at fair and reasonable prices without 
the need for the doctrine. But if the doctrine were required, there is no 
reason in principle why the doctrine should not be applied. Levis is an 
illustration of the Crown receiving the benefit of the doctrine. The 
Court had no difficulty in requiring the Crown to pay a fair and 
reasonable price. There is therefore no reason why the Crown would 
not be required to supply under the same obligation. Similarly, the Post 
Office Department took the benefit of the doctrine in Mayor of Auckland 
v The King. The Court determined that the Post Office having received 
52 The common law of trespass is one example: Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils 275; 
95 ER 807. 
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the benefit of rubbish collection was under an obligation to pay a fair 
and reasonable price for the service. 
4. Fair and Reasonable Price 
Where a supplier of a prime necessity occupies a position of special 
advantage the obligation to supply the service to all who seek it for the 
payment of a fair and reasonable price follows. Reciprocity is a key 
feature of the doctrine, so that anyone receiving supply of the service is 
under a reciprocal duty to pay a fair and reasonable price. Some cases 
have also held that supply cannot be withheld if the former owner of 
premises has arrears.s3 
As yet the New Zealand courts have not had to undergo the task of 
determining a fair and reasonable price. If the parties agree, the court 
may refer the matter to arbitration.
54 The Court of Appeal in State 
Advances settled on the price being charged to other recipients plus the 
connection charges while the court in South Taranaki referred the issue 
to referees.ss 
John Land suggests that the formula the courts are likely to take is a 
cost plus reasonable return. He points to three cases with relevant 
pricing principles:s6 
First, Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd,
57 where the 
court determined the phrase "commercially reasonable" in the 
Waterfront Industry Communication Act 1976 to be the cost of 
providing the service (including a contribution towards capital costs) 
plus a reasonable margin for profit. 
53 State Advances above n 28. 
54 Wairoa above n 31. 
55 South Taranaki above n 32, 958. 
56 Land above n 47, 14-15. 
57 [1990] 2 NZLR 662. 
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Secondly, Air New Zealand Limited v Wellington Int
ernational Airport 
Limited,58 where a statutory obligation on the airp
ort to act "as a 
commercial undertaking" meant it could recover cost
s (including sunk 
costs) and a reasonable return expected of any v
iable commercial 
enterprise. 
Thirdly, the comments of Justice Gault in Clear 
Communications v 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd,
59 where Gault J drew an analogy 
between reasonableness of a firms actions and asse
ssment under the 
doctrine. Gault J determined that reasonable al
lowed additional 
charges to be added on to recover the incrementa
l costs (including 
common costs) and a reasonable return. 
5. Reasonable Terms 
According to Chastain, the obligation to supply requir
es that the supply 
be without unreasonable discrimination between
 those similarly 
situated or who fall into one class of consumers.
60
• The Court held that 
requiring certain customers to provide security depos
its but not others 
was unreasonable discrimination. This extends the
 doctrine further 
than merely reasonable price. In principle this exten
sion is consistent 
with the obligation to supply at fair and reasonable
 prices because it 
ensures the obligation has force. The purpose of req
uiring a fair and 
reasonable price is to make the obligation to 
supply genuine. 
Requiring reasonable terms, precludes practical m
onopolies from 
ostensibly supplying at a fair and reasonable price,
 but in substance 
demanding such onerous terms as to negate the reas
onableness of the 
58 (15 October 1993) unreported, High Court, Wellin
gton Registry, CP 829 / 92 
McGechanJ. 
59 (1993) 5 TCLR 413,430. 
60 Chastain, above n 40, 454. 
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price. Unreasonable pricing is a very tangible measure of whether 
supply is being withheld, but other means of subverting the doctrine 
should also not be tolerated. The Courts ought to err on the side of 
caution when determining reasonableness of terms. But as long as the 
courts are assessing whether supply is effectively being precluded by 
unreasonable terms, then it is within the objects and purposes of the 
doctrine to do so. 
In the United States greater focus has been placed on the duty to 
provide adequate supply to all without discrimination. The common 
law duty of equal and adequate services is a United States 
development of the doctrine of prime necessity.
61 The American duties 
have taken on a greater human rights flavour, which explains why 
discriminatory behaviour is less likely to be tolerated in the United 
States. In New Zealand, such an emphasis has not emerged to the 
same extent. While the doctrine allows for the use of the doctrine as a 
human rights instrument such an application of the doctrine is yet to be 
seen in New Zealand. 
VII. MERCURY V TRANSPOWER 
In recent litigation between Vector and Transpower both the High 
Court and Court of Appeal struck out Vector's action under the 
doctrine. Vector alleged that Transpower New Zealand Ltd's pricing 
policies were unfair, unreasonable, and therefore unlawful.
62 In 
separate causes of action Vector alleged Transpower's pricing 
61 A more detailed discussion follows in Part XIIIA(2) of this paper "Public Utilities 
Law". 
62 Mercury EnergiJ Ltd v TransPower NZ Ltd (24 July 1998) unreported, High Court, 
Auckland Registry, CP 1/98 , 6 [Mercury v Transpower]. 
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methodologies breached section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 and its 
common law obligation to charge fair and reasonably under the prime 
necessity doctrine. Transpower's response was that section 36 does not 
apply to a firm such as itself which is a virtual monopoly. Vector is not 
an immediate competitor of Transpower. Transpower alleged that 
Vector failed to address the anti-competitive purpose element in their 
statement of claim and their claim is so poorly drafted that it is a "total 
write-off",63 incapable of repair. Transpower argued that the doctrine 
had not been part of the law for over 100 years, or if it was it has been 
supplanted by the Commerce Act 1986 and the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE Act). 
A. Decision of the High Court 
In the High Court, Justice Williams and Dr Brunt declined to strike out 
the section 36 cause of action. In respect of the cause of action under 
the doctrine the court struck Mercury's claim. 
The court undertook an extensive review of the New Zealand case law 
and leading Canadian, English, Australian cases. He found the weight 
of authority in the New Zealand High Court and Court of Appeal too 
compelling to conclude other than that the doctrine had been a part of 
New Zealand law at least until 1986.64 The court however was not 
equally compelled by the case law in New Zealand since 1986. The 
movement towards privatisation and corporatisation and the general 
light-handed regulation policy of the government led it to believe that 
the courts' intervention through the doctrine was inconsistent with 
@ Marshall Futures Ltd v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 316, 324 cited from Mercury v 
Transpower above n 62, 3. 
64 Mercury v Transpower above n 62 , 39. 
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such a regime. The Court held that the complexity of economic theory 
and pricing methodologies was not suitable for the courts. Direct 
intervention by the courts is a last resort, and protection for users, 
consumers and suppliers is provided by ministerial recommendation 
for price control under Part IV. SO Es are accountable through 
negotiations between the shareholding ministers and the SOEs in 
preparing the Statement of Corporate Intent. There is no indication in 
the parliamentary debates on the Commerce Act and the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act suggesting the doctrine was intended to survive and 
since there is no express preservation of the doctrine in the Commerce 
Act or the SOE Act the doctrine cannot have been intended to survive.
65 
The court's judgment rests on the broad proposition that the existence 
of the doctrine is inconsistent with the government's implementation of 
a light-handed regulatory system. Reliance on market forces, the 
Commerce Act and the SOE Act provisions for information disclosure 
and accountability mechanisms in a "light-handed way" mean that 
Parliament must have intended to exclude the doctrine. 
B. Decision of the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that while the doctrine is a part 
of New Zealand's common law, the doctrine is eclipsed by the 
Commerce Act and SOEA. 
Richardson P delivered the majority judgment, and Thomas J delivered 
a separate judgment with additional comments on the SOE Act. The 
Court determined that the doctrine had come to form part of the 
common law of New Zealand. It described the doctrine as a blunt, 
65 Mercury v Transpower above n 62, 53-54. 
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"backstop common law remedy" to be applied only in the absence of 
other remedies or anything to the contrary.
66 
In the Court's opinion, the nature of the Commerce Act emphasises a 
deliberate move to a light-handed approach, which the doctrine is 
inconsistent with. Refusals to supply are caught by section 36 where 
there is an anti-competitive purpose. Noting the Privy Council's 
determination in Telecom v Clear that section 36 does not control 
monopoly rents,67 the Court held that Part IV is the appropriate 
mechanism for price control. The Commerce Commission is the 
determiner of prices not the courts. 
Turning to the particular facts of the case, the Court considered that 
Vectors statement of claim "smack[ed] of judicial review in another 
guise". The Court regarded Vector's complaint as primarily being that 
Transpower had not complied with its obligations under the 
Government's section 26 economic statement and the statements of 
corporate intent. Re-iterating the limited nature of judicial review of 
State-owned enterprises,68 the Court was not prepared to allow judicial 
review through the back door. 
Richardson P considered that neither the statement of corporate intents 
nor the scheme of the SOE Act would exclude the doctrine. However, 
the detail of the framework and accountability provisions and the 
specificity of pricing pointed strongly against finding a parallel 
accountability measure through the courts. 
Justice Thomas re-inforced the point that the SOE Act did not in itself 
preclude the doctrine. Thomas J went further to hold that 
accountability in the SOE Act was not of the same character as that 
provided for by the doctrine. The SOE Act he held, does not provide a 
66 Vector v Transpower above n 2, 23. 
67 Telecom v Clear [1995] 1 NZLR 385, 407 (PC). 
68 Judicial review of a State-owned enterprise is limited to situations of fraud, 
corruption or bad faith: Mercun; v ECNZ above n 35, 390 . 
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pricing or price-fixing regime which would displace the doctrine. 
Thomas J emphasised the commercial and arms-length nature of an 
SOE, allowing scope for the doctrine to develop. 
He cautioned that if the doctrine is to develop in today's climate it 
would require some adjustment. The original focus of the doctrine was 
an obligation to supply. The issue of price was included so supply 
could not be negated. The original focus must be returned to as the 
doctrine was never intended to be a "price fixing formula". 
C. Effect of Vector v Transpower 
The effect of the decision is that the doctrine cannot co-exist alongside 
the Commerce Act 1986 and to some extent the SOE Act. The Court 
viewed the statutory framework in the light-handed context as a rug 
over the common law floor. Should the Commerce Act be repealed the 
doctrine could revive. Presently however, it is inconsistent with the 
statutory framework. To assess this position it is necessary to examine 
New Zealand's framework in greater detail. 
VIII. THE REGULATORY CLIMATE IN NEW ZEALAND 
In 1984, the Labour Government returned to power following a lengthy 
National reign and the Muldoon era of strict regulation. The Labour 
government implemented an uncharacteristic regulatory regime. The 
regime was uncharacteristic because it did not reflect Labour's 
traditional welfare state approach. Until this time the New Zealand 
economy was closely monitored by price controls, tariff protections, 
and subsidies. The state had a large presence in the ownership and 
operation of public utilities. The inefficiencies associated with the 
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conflict between the State's roles as owner and as regulator of public 
services motivated a rapid restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy.69 The reforms involved the restructuring of the state sector 
coupled with a liberalisation of the economy. The government 
removed itself from the ownership and operations of public utilities 
through corporatisation and in some instances privatisation. Similar 
restructuring has taken place in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
But whereas state-ownership was replaced with a regulatory interface 
in these countries, the New Zealand government opted for light-
handed regulation. Light-handed regulation uses competition and 
market forces in place of heavy-handed government regulation. The 
approach is based on the presumption that it is "preferable to create 
incentives for market participants (both the regulated and its clients) to 
negotiate solutions, and, if necessary, resort to the legal system, than it 
is for the 'regulator' to directly intervene" .70 Two of the key elements 
of light-handed regulation in New Zealand are the provisions of the 
Commerce Act 1986 preventing anti-competitive behaviour and the 
threat of price control.7
1 
69 These inefficiencies are outlined in Bollard and Pickford "New Zealand's 'Light-
Handed' Approach to Utility Regulation" (1995) 2 Agenda 411,417. 
70 John Belgrave "The Theory behind the existing environment of light handed 
regulation, with practical case studies" New Zealand Institute of Policy Studies 
Symposium Public Utilities: The New Environment Proceedings of a Symposium 
held at Wellington Park Royal 6 October 19993, 3. 
71 Belgrave above n 70, 3. 
CROSSING THE STYX 30 
IX. THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
A. Section 36 
The Commerce Act 1986 represents the "cornerstone of light-handed 
regulation"72 and section 36 has been described as the "lynchpin"
73 of 
light-handed regulation. In the context of monopoly suppliers section 
36 is the key focus. Section 36 provides: 
36. Use of a dominant position in a market - (1) No person who has 
a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the purpose 
of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market 
Essentially section 36 prohibits a person in a dominant position, from 
using that position, for an anti-competitive purpose. 
1. Dominance 
There is a wealth of New Zealand and foreign case law discussing the 
threshold of dominance. Until the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Telecom Corporation NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission
74 
an economic 
definition of dominance had been followed. The Commerce 
72 Mercury v Transpower, above n 62, 42. 
73 R Ahdar "The Privy Council and 'Light-Handed Regulation" (1995) 3 Law 
Quarterly Review 217, 219. 
74 [1992] 3 NZLR 429 [Telecom AMPS-A]. 
CROSSING THE STYX 31 
Commission in Telecom AMPS-A had relied on its earlier decision in 
Proposal by Broadcast Communications Ltd and defined dominance as:
75 
economic strength such that it can behave to a large extent 
independently of that person's competitors. A person in a 
dominant position will be able to effect an appreciable change in 
the price and or other aspects of supply ... for an appreciable 
length of time without suffering serious adverse impact on 
profitability. 
Richardson J delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Telecom 
AMPS-A and criticised the Commission's test as setting too low a 
standard. Dominance, he held ought to be given its ordinary meaning 
not a technical, economic meaning.76 This meaning sets a rigorous 
threshold, requiring more than an advantageous or powerful influence. 
Resorting to the Latin meaning of the word 'dominus' meaning 
'master', Richardson J determined that only one person can be 
dominant in one aspect of a market at one time.
77 
75 (1990) 8 NZAR 433,438. 
76 The rejection of the economic meaning has been criticised as a "major setback to the 
development of New Zealand's competition law" because the view is that the 
Commerce Act should be interpreted consistent with the economic principles and 
concepts it promotes. Ross Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in 
New Zealand Competition Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" 
(1993) 15 NZULR 265,288. 
77 Telecom Corporation NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429, 442. The 
standard set by the Court of Appeal has been criticised as raising the threshold above 
that which was intended: Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New 
Zealand's Competition Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" (1993) 15 
NZULR 265, 267. 
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2. Use 
Dominance alone is not an offence under the Act. The dominant 
person must misuse their position. In New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v 
Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd 78 Tipping J linked the element 'use' to the anti-
competitive purposes. If a person in a dominant position has acted 
with an anti-competitive purpose then they are using their position. 
The Court of Appeal in ECNZ v Geotherm Energy Ltd considered use 
and purpose to be separate concepts.
79 
3. Anti-competitive purpose 
A firm has an anti-competitive purpose if their substantial purpose was 
to restrict, deter, prevent, or eliminate competition.
80 
For some time, 
the courts spent a great deal of time debating whether 'purpose' was to 
be determined objectively or subjectively. Finally, the Court of Appeal 
adopted both tests noting that the distinction between the two tests was 
not drastic because in the absence of actual evidence proving subjective 
purpose, objective evidence is usually referred to.
81 
Purpose has a 
relatively high threshold. A person who intends to do an act which is 
known to have an anti-competitive effect will not satisfy the 
requirements of purpose. Purpose requires the anti-competitive 
conduct be the "object or aim" of the dominant person, not mere 
intention.82 
78 [1990] 3 NZLR 247 (HC) . 
79 [1992] 2 NZLR 641. 
80 Commerce Act 1986, s2(5), s 36(1)(a), (b), (c) . 
81 Commerce Commission v Port Nelson (1995) 5 NZBLC 102-340, 102-358. 
82 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd (1990) 2 NZLR 662, 707. 
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B. The Doctrine & Section 36 Compared 
1. Different purposes 
The underlying tenet of section 36 is distinct from the doctrine. 
Consistent with the purpose of the Commerce Act "to promote 
competition in markets within NZ",83 section 36 has a pro-competitive 
thrust. It is designed to produce competition, which in the long term 
will compete out monopoly rents.84 The focus of section 36 is unilateral 
conduct detrimental to achieving workable competition in a market.
85 
Achieving workable competition is the principal driving force behind 
the prohibition in section 36. The impact of such conduct on other 
parties is a secondary concern. 
In contrast, the doctrine is concerned with ensuring reasonable access 
to public utilities. The reason behind this objective is the public 
importance certain services have. The prevention of anti-competitive 
conduct does not feature in the assessment. The origin of the doctrine 
illustrates that it is founded on a belief that certain property rights are 
affected by the public interest. This public interest creates a social 
obligation. 
2. No Anti-Competitive Purpose Required 
A supplier of a utility of prime necessity who refused to supply access 
(or constructively refused supply by charging excessively) may be 
caught by section 36 only if the supplier had an anti-competitive 
83 Commerce Act 1986, Long Title. 
84 Telecom v Clear [1995] 1 NZLR 385, 407-408 (PC) [Telecom v Clear (PC)]. The Privy 
Council added that the short term solution was provided by Part IV. 
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purpose. It is possible that a supplier who charges competitors 
excessively with the aim of earning monopoly rents may not 
necessarily have an anti-competitive purpose. His purpose may be 
solely to earn excessive profits. As section 36 is currently drafted, it 
does not prohibit the earning of monopoly rents.86 Although the Privy 
Council has said it is legitimate to infer purpose from use of a 
dominant position producing an anti-competitive effect, this is 
rebuttable by evidence showing a contrary subjective intent.
87 
Accordingly, it is quite conceivable that an anti-competitive purpose 
may be lacking though an anti-competitive effect is present (or 
expected). 
3. An Amended Section 36 
The Commerce (Control of a Dominant Position) Amendment Bill 
proposes an amendment to section 36. The amendment repeals section 
36(1) and inserts a new subsection as follows:
88 
(1) No person who has a dominant position in a market must use that 
position-
(a) For the purpose of--
(i) Restricting the entry of any person into any market, not 
being a market exclusively for services; or 
85 Workable Competition (as opposed to perfect competition) is the level of desired 
competition, Commerce Act, s 3(5). 
86 Telecom v Clear (PC) above n 84,407. 
87 Telecom v Clear (PC) above n 84, 402. 
88 Commerce (Control of a Dominant Position) Amendment Bill No. 265-1. Note the 
amended section 36 includes an inserted subsection (lA) which for the purposes of 
this paper is unnecessary to reproduce. 
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(ii) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in any market, not being a market 
exclusively for services; or 
(iii) Eliminating any person from any market, not being a 
market exclusively for services; 
(b) In a manner that has, or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
The purpose of the amendment is to reduce the emphasis on requiring 
proof of an anti-competitive purpose with the objective of deterring 
anti-competitive behaviour. However, the drafting of the amendment 
is confusing. If paragraphs (a) and (b) are to be read conjunctively it 
seems that for a dominant firm to breach the amended section there 
must be an anti-competitive purpose and an effect on competition.
89 
This appears to set the threshold of section 36 higher, because the 
amended section still requires proof of purpose as well as effect. The 
amended section 36 would still not prohibit the earning of monopoly 
profits. If the legislature's intention had been to prohibit such conduct 
it should have excluded paragraph (a). The result would be to 
introduce an "effects test". 
A discussion paper published by the Ministry of Commerce this year 
discusses the possibility of introducing an "effects test" in section 36 in 
place of the "purpose test".90 The test would catch conduct which 
would have the "effect, or likely effect, of restricting, deterring, 
89 The section is ambiguous for another reason. Although it is not of any significance, 
the use of the words "must" in section 36(1) in place of the current wording "shall" is 
odd. The way the amendment reads appears to suggest that a dominant firm 'is not 
required to' have an anti-competitive purpose, which is of course obvious. 
90 "Review of the Competition Thresholds in the Commerce Act 1986 and Related 
Issues: A discussion document" (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1999) 
["Thresholds Discussion Paper"]. 
CROSSING THE STYX 36 
preventing or limiting competition" .91 The Ministry notes some of the 
undesirable consequences of adopting such a test and concludes that an 
"effect test" would not assist in promoting competition in New 
Zealand markets.92 
4 The Implications of an Effects Test on the Doctrine 
If an effects test were adopted in New Zealand, the shortfall which 
currently exists under the section 36 purpose test would be reduced. 
The pro-competitive thrust of section 36 however would still be 
present. In comparison, the doctrine extends to conduct which is 
unreasonable although it has no effect on competition. The sort of 
situation envisaged arises in a situation like the one involving 
Transpower and Vector. First, Transpower as a natural monopoly do 
not necessarily act anti-competitively by charging lines companies 
higher prices. Transpower' s monopoly position is not preserved by 
charging monopoly rents. It is preserved by the unique position it 
derives from being the owner of the National Electricity Grid. 
Charging high prices for access to the grid, could be analysed in some 
instances as more pro-competitive than undercharging. This is because 
assuming it was possible to replicate the National Grid, new-entrants 
are more likely to be deterred or forced out of the market by 
Transpower undercutting prices than over-charging. Secondly, it is 
arguable that in the case of public utilities operated by a monopoly, 
refusals to supply or constructive refusals to supply would not have 
the effect of restricting, deterring, preventing, or limiting competition, 
because there is no competition to begin with. 
91 "Thresholds Discussion Paper", above n 90, 24. 
92 "Thresholds Discussion Paper", above n 90, 24. 
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C. Part IV of the Commerce Act 
The Court of Appeal in Vector v Transpower determined that the 
existence of Part IV of the Commerce Act renders the doctrine 
unnecessary. If controls on prices are to imposed it should be through 
the mechanism provided by Part IV and not through the courts. 
I. Part IV 
Part IV of the Commerce Act provides a mechanism by which the 
Minister of Commerce can recommend that the Governor General 
imposes price controls on specified goods or services.
93 
To make such a 
recommendation the Minister must be satisfied that competition in the 
relevant market is limited or likely to be lessened, and that it is 
necessary or desirable for prices to be controlled in the interests of 
users, consumer or suppliers.94 The Minister also has the power to ask 
the Commission to investigate the necessity for price control, or the 
Commission of its own volition may recommend to the Minister that 
price controls be imposed on specified goods and services.
95 
The threat 
of price control is to be invoked as a last resort and is intended to act as 
a deterrent against the abuse of market dominance.
96 
In the area of 
natural monopolies the potential for abuses of power are high, making 
deterrents like this vital. 
93 Commerce Act 1986, s53(1). 
94 Commerce Act 1986, s53(2). 
95 Commerce Act 1986, ss54(1), 54(3). 
96 "Guarantee of Access to Essential Facilities: A Discussion document" (Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington, 1989) 4. 
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2. Vector v Transpower 
Vector argued that Part IV cannot be intended to supplant the doctrine 
because it is of general application. Vector submitted that Part IV is a 
temporary measure, which does not provide a private cause of action. 
Part IV is not limited to monopolies. If it were there would be greater 
cause to think that it was intended to supplant the doctrine. Part IV is 
limited in time, because an Order in Council must specify a time at 
which control over prices expires. At best, Part IV suspends the 
position of price as long as the Order is valid.
97 The fact that Part IV is 
not limited to monopolies should not impede its ability to supplant the 
doctrine. Indeed, had it been limited to monopolies there would be a 
stronger argument that it eclipsed the doctrine, but just because Part 
IV is broad, it does not mean that it would not exclude the doctrine. 
Similarly the limitation in time of Part IV is to be expected to avoid the 
situation of price control remaining in force beyond what is needed. 
The strongest argument against finding the doctrine supplanted are 
possibly that Part IV as a public remedy is an ineffective and 
inadequate solution. 
3. A Problematic Provision 
Until recently, the likelihood of Part IV being invoked was regarded as 
remote. For the threat of price control to be credible it must be 
supported by a readiness to invoke it with the necessary procedures in 
place. Since Part IV has never been invoked it is questionable whether 
the threat of price control does act as a significant deterrent . Earlier 
this year the cobwebs gathering on Part IV were stirred. The 
97 Written submissions for Vector Limited in the Court of Appeal CA 32/99 Russell 
McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co. para 1.13-1.16 [Vector's submissions]. 
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Commerce (Controlled Goods or Services) Amendment Bill 1999 ('the 
Bill') was introduced to impose price control on lines companies 
following criticisms in the wake of extensive reforms in the Electricity 
Sector.98 The fact that the government chose not to use the price control 
provisions in place in Part IV of the Commerce Act 1986, but chose to 
actually amend the Commerce Act is important. Transpower 
contended that the imposition of price control under Part IV is a 
refined process requiring specific criteria to be met in comparison to 
the "open ended" criteria of the doctrine.99 Part IV involves a specialist 
body, (the Commerce Commission), to set and monitor the 
implementation of prices, through an investigative rather than 
adversarial process. The basis of Transpower's submission is that Part 
IV addresses the same area as the doctrine but in a more sophisticated 
fashion. The Court of Appeal implied similar connotations by referring 
to the doctrine as a "blunt" instrument from a "bygone era" .
100 
Arguably Part IV is not quite as Transpower contends. The fact that 
the government avoided using Part IV itself in order to implement 
price control highlights defects in the present supposedly sophisticated 
tool. 
4. The Ineffectiveness of Public Remedies 
Part IV is a public remedy and affords no private remedies to 
individual consumers, users or supplier. For protection against 
excessive pricing individuals are reliant on the political processes of 
recommendation by the Minister or the Commerce Commission. The 
98 The Electricity Industy Reform Act 1998 but did not have the desired effect on 
electricity prices, which rose. 
99 Written submissions for Transpower New Zealand Limited in the Court of Appeal 
CA 32 / 99 Simpson Grierson para 3.18 [Transpower's submissions]. 
100 Vector v Transpower above n 2, 23. 
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deficiencies of this process is evidenced by the Bill. The Bill lacked 
sufficient support to be passed through Parliament and was 
abandoned. The failure to pass the Bill illustrates the ineffectiveness of 
public remedies, particularly in an MMP environment. Litigation is 
sometimes regarded as a slow and cumbersome process, but the 
passage of this Bill illustrates how ineffective and 'theoretical' a public 
remedy can be. 
5. An Inadequate Remedy 
Essentially Part IV leaves individuals with no private remedy and a 
potentially ineffective public remedy. The High Court and Court of 
Appeal in Vector v Transpower placed a great deal of reliance on the 
threat of and potential invocation of price control under Part IV. In 
theory Part IV provides a public remedy. However, this view ignores 
the practical reality. In reality there will always be reluctance in any 
New Zealand government to introduce price control, because it has the 
potential to undermine the entire light-handed regulatory regime. In 
an economy that has consciously renounced a heavy-handed approach 
any government would be anxious to avoid the political ramifications 
flowing from a failure to uphold the light-handed government policy. 
Consequently, the introduction of price control is not a decision the 
government would enter into lightly. Being an election year, it may be 
unfair to regard the National government's inability to pass the Bill as 
illustrative of the norm. For example, the opposition parties may have 
been more reluctant than usual to allow the National government a 
chance to rectify its embarrassment in the Electricity Reforms. But this 
is precisely the nature of price control. In New Zealand price control is 
politically controversial. It has the potential to be driven by political 
objectives. The Bill shows the government is, in extreme cases, 
prepared to introduce price control but its inability to effect such a 
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decision diminishes the power of the threat of price control and 
reduces the extent to which Part IV can be called a remedy at all. For 
these reasons, Part IV alone does not offer an adequate solution. 
6. The Doctrine in a Heavier Environment 
Although price control is unlikely to be implemented, it is important to 
consider what effect price control may have on the application of the 
doctrine. If price control were invoked the need for the doctrine 
substantially diminishes. Notwithstanding the invocation of price 
control there is a possibility that the doctrine could be relevant. 
Individual dealings between a supplier and user could be 
discriminatory or unreasonable in the particular circumstances even 
though controls on prices have been complied with. Price control is 
likely to be imposed on an industry-wide basis, or to a category of 
suppliers. The doctrine allows the courts to address individual cases of 
injustice notwithstanding that price control requirements have been 
met. 
In the United States, the doctrine exists notwithstanding and 
independent of statutes regulating the conduct of businesses.
101 
Therefore although the United States has regulatory bodies setting 
prices, the doctrine exists in the sense that a public utility has a duty to 
serve on reasonable terms to all who require the service.
102 
The doctrine has existed in heavier times in New Zealand too. 
Prior to the Commerce Act 1986 there was no specific statutory control 
of monopolistic pricing.103 Section 23(1) of the Commerce Act 1975 
101 Corpus Juris Secundum , section 7, Volume 73B. 
102 Am Jur § 16 citing United Fuel Gas Co v Railroad Com 49 S Ct 150 [United Fuel]. 
103 Section 19(2)G) of the Trade Practices Act 1958 considered any "complete or partial 
monopoly of the supply of goods in NZ or any practice tending to about any such 
complete or partial monopoly" to be an examinable trade practice. See Yvonne Van 
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empowered the Commerce Commission to make an order prohibiting 
conduct, which it considered to be contrary to the public interest and 
fell within one of several categories.104 One of these categories included 
an unjustified refusal by a wholesaler to sell or supply goods to a 
retailer.105 A wholesaler was deemed to have refused to supply, if he 
refused to supply goods except at prices or terms which were so 
"disadvantageous as to be likely to deter the retailer from acquiring 
those goods" or to prevent the retailer from acquiring those goods at 
similar terms and conditions to other retailers.
106 
Section 21(1) deemed certain other trade practices to be contrary to the 
public interest. This included trade practices that would have the effect 
of limiting or preventing the supply of goods to consumers.
107 
Conduct prohibited by the doctrine may have fallen within the ambit of 
sections 23 or 21 of the Commerce Act 1975.108 In fact, an 'unjustifiable 
refusal' (particularly with the inserted deeming provision) is very 
similar to the doctrine. The insertion in 1971 of conduct deemed to be a 
refusal to supply is consistent with the doctrine's obligation to supply 
and to do so reasonably. The provisions were however reliant on the 
Commission to hold an inquiry into the alleged conduct. Neither 
enactments created mechanisms for private redress in the Courts. 
Begrudged users were reliant on the respective Commissions to 
Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (2 ed CCH New Zealand Ltd, 
Auckland, 1991) 146. 
104 Section 19(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1958 (the predecessor to the 1975 Act) 
similarly empowered the Trade Practices and Prices Commission. 
105 Commerce Act 1975, s 23(1)(i). Trade Practices Act 1958; s 19(2)(i). 
106 Sections 23(5) and 23(6) of the Commerce Act 1975. Trade Practices Act 1958; 
s19(2)(i). Section 9 of the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1971 inserted a new 
s19(2)(i) which included the deeming provision in regard to refusals to supply. 
107 Commerce Act 1975, section 21(l)(g). Trade Practices Act 1958, section 20(1)(e). 
108 The provisions catch refusals to supply to retailers and consumers or refusals to 
supply to retailers which consequently limit the supply of goods to consumers. 
However, the provisions do not seem to cover a refusal to supply to a consumer, 
except at unreasonable prices or terms. 
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undertake an investigation. Notwithstanding these provisions the 
doctrine existed and was applied by the courts. 
In Wairoa the Board's licence prescribed maximum charges for the 
supply of bulk electricity. The Council argued that the Board's charges 
despite being below the maximum prescribed levels were nevertheless 
unfair and unreasonable. The Court of Appeal accepted that if the 
Council could show the charges were unreasonable, the charges would 
be reduced to a reasonable amount. 
If price control were invoked the doctrine could continue to be relevant 
in several ways. Wairoa indicates the readiness of the courts to apply 
the doctrine to unreasonable prices, despite price control having been 
complied with. 
The continued application of the doctrine under the earlier legislation 
highlights the concurrent existence of public and private remedy. In 
the (unlikely) event of a supplier violating price control provisions and 
attempting to charge above the regulated price, users or consumers 
could seek damages under the doctrine. 
Price control does not oblige a supplier of essential services to supply. 
The doctrine therefore could be invoked if a supplier refused to supply 
or a user failed to pay. The reciprocal nature of the doctrine, would 
allow a supplier to recover payment for services provided to a user, 
which price control does not. 
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D. Implied Repeal by the commerce act 
The removal of common law rights requires express statutory wording 
or a necessary implication.109 Since the Commerce Act does not provide 
an express repeal of the doctrine, the question is whether the Act as a 
whole implicitly repeals the doctrine. 
1. No Express Preservation 
The Commerce Act refers to two areas of the common law. Section 7 of 
the Commerce Act protects breach of confidence and restraint of trade. 
Transpower claimed that if Parliament went to the trouble to expressly 
preserve these aspects of the common law, they would have included 
the doctrine, had they intended it to survive. A distinction can be 
drawn however, between the types of law Parliament chose to 
expressly protect and the doctrine. Breach of confidence and restraint 
of trade are precisely the types of law that might otherwise inhibit 
competition, and may even be considered anti-competitive. These are 
common law doctrines substantially at odds with the pro-competitive 
force of the Commerce Act. Arguably, Parliament has legislated their 
protection to avoid the courts mistaking that they are implicitly 
repealed by the Act. Parliament has merely clarified the position in 
relation to those aspects of law. The doctrine is not an anti-competitive 
doctrine so there is less of a need to expressly preserve it. 
109 Australian Tramway Employee Association v Prahran & Malvern Tramway Trust (1913) 
17 CLR 680, 687. Compare Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622 
where the court held that it was a necessary implication of the Resource Management 
Act 1981 that a common law right of an owner to protect their lawn from erosion 
without a resource consent could no longer be asserted. 
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2. Commerce Act is not a Code 
Transpower alleged that the doctrine is inconsistent with the 
Commerce Act because Parliament has chosen to deal with monopolies 
in three ways. Namely, by prohibiting them from using their position 
for an anti-competitive purpose, participating in restrictive trade 
practices, and through the threat of price control. Parliament 
deliberately omitted to permit private remedies for a party wishing to 
challenge a monopolist's price. This omission Transpower submitted, 
excludes the doctrine.110 
The general tenor of Transpower's submission is open to criticism 
because it implies that the Commerce Act forms some sort of code. 
Courts do not typically regard code arguments with much weight.
111 
Moreover, the Commerce Act is not a code. If section 36 does not deal 
with monopoly rents and does not deal with obligations to supply 
there can be no necessary implication that the legislation supplants the 
doctrine. Arguably, had Parliament wished to repeal a fundamental 
doctrine that has so evidently been part of the law regulating public 
utilities it would have done so clearly. 
X. STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES ACT 1986 
In Vector v Transpower the Court of Appeal considered the effect of the 
SOE Act on the doctrine. The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 is 
relevant where the monopoly supplier of the essential service is an 
110 Transpower Submissions above n 99, 13. 
m Michael Taggart "State-Owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility: A 
contradiction in terms?" [1993] NZ Recent Law Review 343, 352 "SOEs Social 
Responsibility". 
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SOE. In New Zealand several facilities subject to the doctrine are 
supplied by SOEs. 
A. Scope of the Act 
The process of deregulation of the New Zealand economy resulted in 
the corporatisation (and in some cases privatisation) of public utilities. 
State-owned enterprises operate at arms-length to the government. 
The idea behind this structure was to remove government influences 
from these services. Removing the political element and introducing 
competition was intended to improve efficiency. The arms-length 
arrangement means the Minister is responsible for policy but does not 
direct the day-to-day operations. SOEs are however, accountable to 
their shareholding Ministers, who are in tum accountable to the House 
of Representatives. To facilitate accountability SOEs are subject to 
information disclosure requirements. SOEs are required to deliver a 
draft of their annual statement of corporate intent (SCI) to Ministers.
112 
If the Minister makes any comments on the draft these must be 
considered by an SOE. The completed SCI is then delivered to the 
Minister. The SOE must also deliver annual reports and accounts to 
the shareholding Ministers.113 
112 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 14 ["SOE Act"]. Note also that electricity 
companies are subject to additional disclosure requirements under the Electricity 
(Information Disclosure) Regulations 1999 pursuant to section 170 of the Electricity 
Act 1992. 
113 SOE Act, sl5. 
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B. Applicability of the doctrine to SO Es 
Consistent with the arguments advanced in relation to the applicability 
to the Crown, the doctrine is equally applicable to SOEs.
114 
Any doubts 
about applying the doctrine to the Crown are substantially diminished 
when applying the doctrine to SOEs because they are entities at arms-
length to the Crown. SOEs are intended to have a commercial focus. 
Their principal objective is to operate as a successful business.
115 
The 
commercial focus of SOEs and the courts emphasis on putting them on 
a "level playing field" with private sector competitors aligns SOEs 
closely with private companies.116 Yet SOEs possess distinctively 
public features. They are subject to the Ombudsmen Act 1973, the 
Official Information Act 1982, and oversight of the Auditor-General. 
These features of an SOE bring it within the notion of a business 
affected with a public interest to an even greater extent that an private 
company. The combination therefore of commerciality and public 
interest makes SOEs a prime candidate for the doctrine. While the 
principal objective of an SOE is to operate as a successful business, 
section 4(1)(c) of the SOE Act requires SOEs to exhibit a sense of social 
responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community and 
endeavouring to accommodate and encourage this where possible.
117 
The courts have held that this provision is not couched in the language 
of a duty, and does not give rise to a cause of action by way of judicial 
review of civil action.118 The provision does however, create an 
environment compatible with the principles inherent in the doctrine. 
Galbraith contends that section 4(1)(c) incorporates values such as 
n4 See above Part VI(B)(3) "Applicability of the Doctrine to the Crown" . 
ns SOE Act, s 4(1). 
n6 AEPB v ECNZ above n 33. 
n7 SOE Act, s 4(1)(c). 
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legality, fairness and reasonableness.119 Arguably therefore, the 
doctrine is consistent with the statutory requirements of an SOE. 
C. Displacement of the Doctrine by the SOE Act 
The issue is whether there is room for the doctrine in the current 
regime. Parliament has not expressly repealed the doctrine. 
Consequently the existence of the doctrine will depend upon whether 
the accountability regime imposed by the SOE Act is sufficiently 
comprehensive to exclude the doctrine. Justice Williams suggested 
that the accountability framework eliminates the need for the courts to 
intervene. Parliament, has deliberately decreed accountability, 
including pricing issues, to be "in the hands of the SOE's, their 
shareholding Ministers, Parliament and, ultimately the electorate.
120 
Richardson P held that "it is clearly arguable"
121 that the commercial 
nature of SOEs did not give them immunity from the doctrine; that the 
SCis did not prescribe prices to the extent of precluding the doctrine; 
and that the scheme of the Act did not grant Ministers the power to fix 
prices under sections 13 and 14. Richardson concluded however, that 
the framework as a whole pointed against the finding of "a parallel 
private law accountability" through the courts. 
This view is open to criticism because it effectively disregards the place 
of common law doctrines in the legal system. The Courts do not 
require a statutory defined role to interpret and apply the common law. 
Similarly the existence of the common law does not depend on 
118 AEPB v ECNZ above n 33, 555-557. Professor Taggart criticises the Court for not 
putting up any fight to protect the "constitutional right of access to the Court": 
"SO Es Social Responsibility", above n 111, 352. 
119 Galbraith, above n3, 233. 
120 Mercury v Transpower, above n 62, 49. 
121 Vector v Transpower, above n 2, 28. 
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statutory authorisation. The nature of the common law is that it ebbs 
and flows wherever Parliament has not legislated otherwise. 
Unlike Richardson P, Thomas J was not equally convinced. Stressing 
first that accountability per se does not exclude the courts, he held that 
the SOE Act itself did not provide a pricing regime excluding the 
doctrine.122 
Arguably this view appreciates the true nature of the relationship 
between SOEs and Ministers in respect of accountability and pricing 
issues. SOEs are accountable to Ministers but the intention of the 
reforms was for SOEs to create distance between Ministers and SOEs. 
SOEs are to operate as successful commercial businesses. The 
statements of corporate intent do not amount to a detailed pricing 
negotiation between the SOE and responsible Minister. SO Es are 
simply required to "consider" comments from the Minister.
123 
Ultimately, SOEs' pricing decisions are commercial decisions made by 
the Board of the SOE, not the Minister and not the SOE Act. 
XI. THE DOCTRINE WITHIN LIGHT-HANDED REGULATION 
The inconsequentiality of the SOE Act, the inadequacy of Part IV and 
the incongruity of section 36 with the doctrine show that the doctrine is 
not easily eclipsed by the Commerce Act. Its consistency with light-
handed regulation in general must be examined. 
A. The Critical Role of the Courts 
122 Vector v Transpower, above n 2, 29 -30. 
123 SOE Act 1986, s 14(4). 
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Light-handed regulation was never intended to mean no regulation 
whatsoever.124 Arguably resort to the courts is an important and even 
necessary element of light-handed regulation. Dr Bollard, the former 
Commerce Commission Chairman has commented on the role of the 
courts and of private actions.125 His paper specifically cites the prime 
necessity doctrine as playing a role in light-handed regulation. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed his comments as influenced by the recent 
court decision in AEPB v ECNZ.126 His paper has no legal authority, yet 
it is a reasonably compelling comment. It shows perhaps that the 
Commerce Commission is content for the courts to assist the 
Commerce Commission in this manner. 
B. Light-Handed Regulation frustrated 
The doctrine plays a vital role in light-handed regulation by providing 
a control on the abuse of power by monopolies in the important area of 
essential services. As Galbraith points out, a utility which is allowed to 
earn monopoly rents will have no incentive to be efficient.
127 
Galbraith argues that unless there are adequate restraints to ensure that 
a monopoly does achieve efficiency objectives, the overall policy of 
light-handed regulation is frustrated.128 The courts' involvement could 
124 Belgrave, above n 70, 2. 
125 Bollard and Pickford "New Zealand's 'Light-Handed' Approach to Utility 
Regulation" (1995) 2 Agenda 411,417. 
126 The Court of Appeal said that ECNZ conceded the application of the doctrine in 
AEPB v ECNZ and before the Privy Council expressed caution about this concession: 
Vector v Transpower above n2, 25. 
127 AR Galbraith "Deregulation, Privatisation and Corportisation of Crown Activity: 
How will the law respond?" 1993 (New Zealand Law Conference The Law and 
Politics 2-5 March 1993, Wellington, New Zealand Conference Papers Volume 1) 226, 
236. 
128 Galbraith above n 3,236. 
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aid the process of light-handed regulation, because it provides an
 
alternative mechanism for controlling monopolistic behaviour without
 
the need to resort to price control. The doctrine offers a less overt
 
control on the abuse of power by a monopoly than the price control
 
provisions. Continued application of the doctrine will mitigate the
 
need for Part IV to be invoked and consequently the risk of policy
 
failure. 
C. Courts as price fixers 
The High Court was not inclined to deal with matters of complex
 
economic theory. In the courts view the doctrine required the courts to
 
assume the role of a price fixing body. This role was one which the
 
court considered to be complex and ill-suited to the adversarial
 
process.129 The Court of Appeal emphasised that price control was not
 
a role that had been granted to the courts, though they never cited
 
economic complexity or the judicial capacity as the hindrance. Instead
 
the Court seemed deterred by the bluntness of the doctrine. The Court
 
is correct not to allow complexity to deter it. Courts engage in complex
 
matters all the time. Predatory pricing matters, for example. The
 
bluntness of the doctrine is apparent. But the doctrine has existed in
 
the courts for nearly two centuries. Its bluntness comes from its
 
simplicity and its simplicity gives it the flexibility to endure the test of
 
time. 
D. Adjustments to the Doctrine 
129 Mercury v Transpower above n 62, 54. 
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The criticism of the doctrine as a price control instrumen
t is to some 
extent warranted. The doctrine was not borne out of mode
rn economic 
ideas about pricing. The doctrine is a simple concept
 designed to 
ensure supply of and access to the most essential of pu
blic utilities. 
Decreasing the focus on pricing, as Justice Thomas a
dvocates, is 
consistent with the original purpose of the doctrine. T
he means of 
adopting this change are problematic. To reduce the e
mphasis on 
pricing, there will be a tendency to be less specific in pr
icing issues. 
The courts must look at the situation and decide whether t
he defendant 
supplier is fulfilling his obligation to supply the prime 
necessity, or 
whether the defendant is 'constructively' refusing to s
upply. The 
doctrine could therefore be re-phrased as requiring: 
Where a public utility or service of prime necessity is own
ed or 
operated by a person in a position of special advantage
, that 
person in under an obligation to grant real and effective s
upply 
of that utility or service to all who seek it wi
thout 
discrimination. 
This takes the pricing terminology out of the doctrine's f
ormula. The 
courts would have to be relied on to take the pricing foc
us out of the 
practical application of the doctrine. Taking the focus of
 the doctrine 
away from pricing would alleviate the task of the Courts. It 
would also 
eliminate any criticisms of a clash with Part IV. 
XII. REVIEW OF THE NEW ZEALAND FRAMEWORK 
The Commerce Act provides the strongest defence again
st abuses of 
monopoly powers by suppliers of essential service
s. But the 
Commerce is very limited in protections. Section 36 is the
 only control 
currently in force against monopolies. Section 36 howev
er, does not 
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extend to obligations to supply, nor does it prohibit unreasonable 
pricing. Even in the decision of Court of Appeal dismissing the 
doctrine's applicability, Justice Thomas did not refrain from expressing 
his doubts about the deficiencies of a system without such 
protections .130 
Part IV of the Commerce Act does not deal specifically with the subject 
matter of the doctrine. It does not recognise the reason why the 
doctrine imposes an obligation only on services of prime necessity. 
Part IV is triggered by an actual, or likely lessening of competition. As 
with section 36, Part IV serves a different purpose. Part IV is arguably 
a problematic and ineffective tool. It provides only a public remedy. 
Public remedies are in general reliant on democratic and political 
processes. As a public remedy, Part IV is even less adequate because of 
the political overtones of price control. The Court of Appeal it seems, 
were most influenced by the fact that the doctrine was too much of a 
price-fixing instrument. If it were given a different emphasis, as 
Thomas J suggested, the courts may feel more comfortable asserting its 
role. But the doctrine will always require some reliance on a fair and 
reasonable price. The courts must be prepared to give the doctrine its 
full application if necessary. Thomas J' s suggestion may win support 
for the doctrine from those who currently see it as a heavy-handed tool. 
Whether the emphasis placed on the doctrine is in regard to an 
obligation to supply, or the requirement of a fair and reasonable price, 
the doctrine has an important role to play in light-handed regulation. 
The need for the doctrine can be seen when the New Zealand context is 
compared to the structures in overseas countries. 
130 Vector v Transpower above n 2, 31. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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XIII. USES OF THE DOCTRINE OVERSEAS 
A. The United States experience 
1. A Constitutional Setting 
The use of the doctrine in the United States is quite unique. The 
implications of the Munn decision were that businesses "clothed with a 
public interest" submitted to having their compensation regulated by 
the legislature. Waite CJ justified legislative price control on the basis 
of a common law principle that some services are affected with a public 
interest and therefore fair and reasonable prices should be charged. 
The implementation of fair and reasonable prices by the legislature is 
merely enforcing a recognised common law obligation. Price control 
consequently, is unconstitutional except when applied to businesses 
affected with a public interest. There is no parallel in the New Zealand 
context since legislative price regulation (or Executive price control) is 
not required to pass a constitutionality test first. 
Judicial acceptance of the Munn view lasted until 1934, with the 
decision of Nebbia v New York. 131 The Supreme Court rejected the 
restriction upon the legislature to regulate only the prices of businesses 
affected with a public interest, and extended the legislature's power to 
regulate in the public interest, as it saw fit. 
2. Public Utilities Law 
Notwithstanding the decision in Nebbia, Lord Hale's principles have 
been applied by the US judiciary to the extent that a body of law 
imposing duties on owners of public utilities has developed. 
131 (1934) 291 us 502. 
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Generally the public utilities doctrine provides that a public utility has 
a general duty to serve those who desire its services, independent of 
the statutory context.132 A public utility is a business or service, which 
supplies the public regularly with a commodity of public 
consequence.133 That duty grants the consumer a common law right to 
reasonable rates.134 In Foltz v Indianapolis,135 the Supreme Court of 
Indiana explored the development of the doctrine. Judge Arteburn 
cited passages from both Munn and Allnutt and held that "upon the 
dedication of a business to a public use, it is established that such a 
business is under a common law duty to serve all who apply so long as 
facilities are available without discrimination".
136 Arteburn J stressed 
that "without discrimination" included discrimination as to price, since 
otherwise the principles could be "circumvented". 
Professors Haar and Fessler devote an entire book to what they term 
the common law duty of equal and adequate services.
137 
Haar and 
Fessler summarise the unifying themes in the United States judges 
reasoning as:138 
1. The imposition of a common right to access drawn from the 
doctrine of services as a public calling essential to individual survival 
within the community 
132 United Fuel above n 102 ; Corpus Juris Secundum section 7, vol 73B. 
133 64 Am Jur 2d §1. 
134 Corpus Juris Secundum section 25, vol 73B. 
135 130 NE 2d 650 (1955) [Foltz]. 
136 Foltz above nl35, 656. 
137 Charles Haar and Daniel Fessler The Wrong Side of the Tracks (Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1986). Their argument is that equal access to basic services should not be 
pursued through federal courts and the Constitution, but through state courts and the 
common law, because of the increasing difficulty of pursuing constitutional theories 
in federal forums. 
138 Haar and Fessler, above n 137, 199-200. 
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2. The duty to serve all equally, inferred from and recognised as an 
essential part of natural monopoly power 
3. The duty to serve all parties alike, as a consequence of the grant of 
the privileged power of eminent domain and finally 
4. The duty to serve all equally, flowing from consent, expressed or 
(more frequently) implied. 
The themes running through the common law duties are comparable to 
the prime necessity doctrine. The similarity of the American doctrine 
was noted at first instance by Justice Barker in AEPB v ECNZ where he 
said:139 
I do not find anything in the American authorities cited, such as 
Foltz v City of Indianapolis 130 NE 2d 650 (1955) basically different 
from the situation as articulated by the Privy Council in the City 
of Levis case and in the New Zealand cases cited. 
Yet the United States law on public utilities has developed in a more 
expansive manner. The doctrine has been applied to a wider variety of 
services, an example of which is telecommunications. The American 
doctrine has been applied to telegraph and telephone companies.
140 
There is also a greater emphasis on equality and the struggle against 
inequality and poverty. The notion that all citizens especially those 
living on the 'wrong side of the tracks' are treated equally is an 
important strand in the common law duties. 
139 AEPB v ECNZ (HC) above n 33, 60. 
140 State ex rel v Kinloch Telephone Co (1902) 67 SW 684. 
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3. Essential Facilities doctrine 
Alongside the public utilities body of law is the flourishing essential 
facilities doctrine. The essential facilities doctrine is quite different to 
the American equivalent of the prime necessity doctrine. A gloss on 
the Sherman Act, the essential facilities doctrine has developed as an 
interpretative aid to section 2 of the barren anti-trust instrument. 
Section 2 provides: 
Every person who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, 
or combine to conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolise any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of 
a rnisdemeanour .... 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is much broader in scope than section 36. 
In New Zealand it is not an offence to be a monopoly. But section 2 
prohibits monopolisation itself. 
The essential facilities doctrine makes liable controllers of essential 
facilities if they refuse access to their facility. The concern underlying 
the doctrine is that the control of an essential facility by a monopoly 
may be misused in an upstream or downstream market in which the 
monopoly also competes. Anti-trust law in the United State imposed 
the obligation to allow access to competitors on non-discriminatory 
terms. Generally the doctrine requires that "where facilities cannot 
practicably be duplicated by would be competitors those in possession 
of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms".
141 
141 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc 570 F 2d 982 (1977) 992-993 [Hecht] cited by Barker J in ARA 
v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport ) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 680. 
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4. Essential facilities and Prime Necessity doctrines compared 
The essential facilities doctrine has a different thrust. It is focused on 
anti-competitive conduct regarding access to a 'bottleneck facility'. 
Actions under the essential facilities doctrine are dependent on actions 
under the Sherman Act. Although there is some debate as to whether 
the duty under the essential facilities doctrine is an action limited to 
competitors,142 the doctrine seems to be aimed at competitors of the 
supplier. The MCI Communications Corporation v AT&T
143 
test for 
liability is as follows: 
1. Control of the essential facility by a monopolist 
2. A competitor's inability to practically or reasonably duplicate 
the essential facility 
3. The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor and 
4. The feasibility of providing the facility 
This framing of the essential facilities doctrine refers only to 
competitors, suggesting that the doctrine is limited to competitors of 
the supplier. This is consistent with the anti-trust origin of the 
doctrine. In comparison, the prime necessity doctrine is not a tool of 
anti-trust law. In fact, it could be said to share a closer relationship 
with public or constitutional law. For this reason the prime necessity 
doctrine is aimed at users of the utility and is less concerned with the 
effect on competitors and competition. 
The essential facilities doctrine is also potentially much broader than 
the prime necessity doctrine, since its definition has not been restricted 
to utilities of a public necessity, a feature which is inherent in the prime 
142 Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Anti-Trust Policy: The Law of Competition and its practice 
(West Publishing Company, Minnesota, 1994) 273 § 7.7. 
143 104 s Ct 234 (1983). 
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necessity doctrine. In Hecht v Pro Football Inc the essential facilities 
doctrine was held to apply to a sports stadium.144 The Australian case 
of Queensland Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Co 
Ltd & Anor is a classic illustration of a situation that would not fulfil the 
criteria of being a prime necessity, because the essential facility was a 
'Y-bar', a component of a fence post.145 In neither New Zealand nor 
Australia has the essential facilities doctrine actually been applied. The 
court in ARA v Mutual Rental Cars "adopted" the dictum of the 
American court in Hecht but did not find it necessary to decide whether 
the essential facilities doctrine applied, because section 36 was satisfied. 
B. Australia 
I. Rejection of the Prime Necessities Doctrine 
The Australian courts have declined to follow the Levis line of thought. 
The High Court of Australia in Bennett & Fisher v The Electricity Trust of 
South Australia146 said that the American public utility law was not part 
of Australian law. The High Court's reasoning is not without its 
critics. Professor Taggart refers to the decision as a "wrong turning".
147 
Among other things, Taggart criticised the narrow and literal 
interpretation given to the sections 15-16 of the South Australia Electric 
Light and Motive Power Company's Act 1897 (which is very much like 
a codification of the American public utility duty). The provisions, 
Taggart stated, should have been given a purposive interpretation to 
impose a statutory duty to supply. But the court was more concerned 
with the encroachment on the freedom of contract. One of the most 
condemning features of the case is that the leading case of the doctrine 
144 [Hecht], see also Fishman v Wirtz 807 F2d 520 (1986). 
145 (1988) ATPR 40-841. 
146 106 CLR 492 [Bennett]. 
147 "Public Utilities and Public Law" above nl8, 252. 
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of prime necessity was not referred to in the judgment. The court 
focuses its attention on the American authorities, which it contends, 
have "not yet been established in English law" and can have no 
application alongside the South Australia statutes.148 The failure to 
refer to the Privy Council's decision is a critical oversight. The decision 
effectively ignores the leading common law authorities and focuses on 
American doctrine, which it can then dismiss as inappropriate. 
C. Synopsis 
This examination has shown that the courts in the United States have 
several layers of regulatory devices to draw on when seeking to control 
monopolistic behaviour. The broader nature of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, the wide use of the essential facilities doctrine in the 
United States and development of the public utilities doctrine combine 
to create a system aware of the necessity of curbing abuses of 
monopoly power. 
The Australian courts rejection of the doctrine lends weight to the 
argument that the doctrine is not necessary. However, the courts' 
actions in both Australia and the United States must be read in the 
context of the regulatory structures in place in these countries. In both 
countries the courts are only one player in the regulatory game. 
To see the full picture, further examination of individual countries 
regulation of public utilities is required. 
148 Bennett above n 146, 501. 
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XIV. REGULATION OFPUBLIC UTILITIES 
In comparison to New Zealand's light-handed approach, regulation of 
public utilities overseas is more tightly monitored. Although the Court 
of Appeal in Vector v Transpower held that this light-handed approach 
made any other type of control, such as the doctrine, inconsistent. The 
problem is - what is the position without the doctrine. Arguably, 
reliance on Part IV and market forces is naive. Essentially this entails 
reliance on the good faith of monopolists to act in a fair and reasonable 
way. Patterson argues that economic theory predicts that a monopoly 
will act in its own self-interest.149 Therefore a likely consequence of a 
light-handed regulation policy is misuse of monopoly power. 
A. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, privatisation efforts began under the Thatcher 
government. With greater privatisation, heavy reliance is placed on 
industry-specific regulation to supervise and regulate activities in 
markets lacking competition. Specific legislation regulating conduct in 
industries is common. For example, the Telecommunications Act 1981, 
the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982, and the Energy Act 1983.
150 
This 
industry-specific regulation diminished the need for the courts' 
application of common law duties. 
149 Ross Patterson "Light-Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years on" (1998) 
CCLJ 134, 151. 
150 For a fuller list see "A Discussion Paper: Guarantee of Access to Essential 
Facilities" (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1989) Annex I. 
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B. Australia 
In Australia, additional controls exist too. Australia has a history of 
managing key sectors of its economy through state-owned public 
enterprises with competition not usually permitted.151 In this way 
restrictions can be placed on the abuse of power by requiring them to 
set fair prices. Australia is a useful economy to examine because it 
places some reliance on general competition law.152 However, 
Australia does not rely on competition alone. The Australian 
legislature has seen fit to address access issues to public utilities by 
implementing an access regime for essential facilities. The regime is 
driven by the Hilmer Report, which owes its name to the chairman of 
the Independent Committee of Inquiry into National Competition 
Policy. The rationale behind the regime is that "access to certain 
facilities with natural monopoly characteristics, such as electricity grids 
or gas pipelines, is needed to encourage competition in related 
markets".153 The regime will apply to all nationally significant 
"essential facilities" whether privately owned or by federal or state 
governments. Several perceived reasons have been cited for the access 
regime, including the failure of the courts in establishing prices and 
terms of access.154 The access regime is directed at essential facilities. 
This includes some utilities subject to the prime necessity doctrine. 
However the access regime is directed at dealing with anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
While an access regime like the one established in Australia could be 
extremely beneficial in New Zealand, the undoubted expense of 
151 For example, the mail service, telecommunications, water, electricity and many 
transport services have been provided by the public service. 
152 Such as the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. 
153 Parliamentary Second Reading Speech to the June 1995 legislation, cited from 
Warren Pengilly "Access to essential facilities: a unique antitrust experiment in 
Australia" 1998 43 Antitrust Bulletin 519. 
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establishing and maintaining such a scheme may be a barrier. The 
Australian regime creates specific statutory bodies to administer the 
regime.155 Because of this it is arguably not within the finances of the 
New Zealand government. It would also involve a major shift in 
governmental policy. In the absence of such a system, the prime 
necessities doctrine could provide similar protection in prime 
necessities industries. It is possible that the need for such a regime may 
be mitigated in New Zealand if the doctrine continues to be accepted 
and applied by the Courts. 
C. United States 
The United States has a highly developed system of anti-trust law of 
which some has been discussed in preceding sections. In addition to 
anti-trust law and the application of the essential facilities doctrine, 
there is a major difference between the way in which the United States 
addresses threats to competition. The United States relies heavily on 
industry-specific regulation in the form of Commission regulation. In 
the United States essential services have predominantly always been 
operated by private monopolies. Their regulation often comes by way 
of an independent agency. Many states have a Public Service 
Commission or a Public Commission and the Federal Government has 
designated public bodies. 
154 Pengilly above n 153. 
155 The National Competition Council (NCO) makes an initial evaluation of the 
essentiality of the service and its national importance and makes a recommendation 
to the responsible minister as to whether or not to grant access. 
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D. Comparison with New Zealand 
All three jurisdictions have alternatives to the doctrine. In comparison 
New Zealand has come from being one of the most regulated 
economies in the world, to one of the most deregulated.156 One 
commentator suggests that in reality the system is best described as 
"hands-off" rather than "light-handed" .157 Another commentator has 
called it "non-regulation".158 New Zealand has chosen to rely very 
heavily on market forces in all sectors of the market, even those where 
competition is difficult. New Zealand is a small economy, where a 
small number of suppliers in each industry is common. 
The methods used overseas such as industry-specific regulation, 
regulatory bodies and access regimes show overseas countries 
recognise the significance of public utilities. New Zealand's strongest 
methods of controlling monopolies are the provisions in the Commerce 
Act, one of which does not apply to the abuses in question, and the 
other provides no satisfactory remedy. There are therefore few 
deterrents against monopolies abusing their power. 
156 Ross Patterson "What Happened to the Brave Experiment of Light-Handed 
Regulation? Was the concept flawed or have the courts failed to deliver attainable 
benefits" in Conference Papers: The 1993 New Zealand Law Conference (1993) vol 1, 1. 
157 Ross Patterson "Light-Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years on" (1998) 
CCLJ 134, 151. 
158 HS Dordick "New Zealand Testing the Limits on Non Regulation" in Noam 
Komatsu and Conn Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin- an Evolutionary Approach 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) 438. 
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XV. CONCLUSION 
In Vector v Transpower the Court of Appeal held that the prime 
necessities doctrine was incompatible with the regulatory principles 
underlying the statutory framework in New Zealand. The Court was 
content to regard the remedy provided by Part N of the Commerce Act 
as sufficient. The conclusion that the doctrine has been impliedly 
repealed by the Commerce and SOE Acts can be regarded as 
unsatisfactory. While the price regulation of the doctrine may need to 
be softened for the context of the New Zealand regulatory framework 
this could be addressed by the courts moving the doctrine away from 
price fixing and back towards an obligation to supply. In the absence of 
the doctrine in some form the possibility of enforceable access to public 
utilities may be regarded as unpromising. 
Experience suggests that Part N of the Commerce Act does not provide 
a practical solution to the abuses of monopoly power. Given the 
current light-handed approach to the regulation of competition this is 
likely to continue. In contrast, in overseas regimes competition alone 
tends not to be relied on to regulate public utilities. Public utilities 
which are of prime necessity, are an area requiring specific attention. 
The doctrine captures only essential services operated in monopolistic 
environments. It is these markets that lack the competitive forces and 
incentives to be efficient. The historical manner in which these utilities 
have been removed from the control of the State in New Zealand has 
meant that there is an even greater need for supervision. The 
monopoly power inherited from the State creates a situation, which is 
open to abuse. Monopolies have the ability to operate to the detriment 
of the consumer because they can charge higher prices than would 
exist if there were a fully competitive market. Unlike other 
jurisdictions New Zealand has bravely left regulation of markets to 
competitive forces. Monopolies should not be allowed to abuse their 
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power in any market. But where the utility is of prime necessity, wider 
issues are at stake. Greater precautions are necessary. The prime 
necessity doctrine can be regarded as a satisfactory beginning and it 
allows the government to continue its light-handed regulatory policy. 
A change in focus may be necessary, but the force of the doctrine 
should not be sacrificed as a result. Consequently the doctrine should 
retain all of its elements. 
If the ferryman Charon had decided to engage in rent-seeking 
behaviour less people would be able to use his services. As a result the 
number of condemned souls would be forced to wander the deserted 
shore. Excluding people from reaching the Underworld, would not 
have been in the public interest. Conferring a duty on Charon to 
provide his services as a reasonable price would have ensured that he 
could not adversely affect the public interest in such an essential 
service. 
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